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Gene V. Crawford and Sherry T. Crawford (the "Crawfords"), by and through their 
counsel of record, respectfully submit their Appellants' Brief. 
I. JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from the final judgment of the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick of the 
Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on March 31,1998. Though 
filed in the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0) (1996), this 
appeal was assigned to this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (1996). This 
Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996). 
II. STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A brief statement of procedural history is necessary to the statement of issues. This 
case was resolved by the trial court's grant of the first Motion for Summary Judgment of 
plaintiff/appellee National Advertising Company ("National"). R. 78-81. The trial court 
granted that motion even though the Crawfords were not parties to the action. Based on that 
ruling, the trial court subsequently denied the Crawfords' Motion to Reconsider, denied the 
Crawfords' Motion for Summary Judgment on their Counterclaim, and granted National's 
second Motion for Summary Judgment. R. 85-95, 222-23, 316-320, 348-51. In so ruling, 
the trial court held that the outdoor advertising permit granted to the Crawfords by Murray 
City (the "Crawfords' Permit") was null and void, and that National's outdoor advertising 
permit ("National's Permit") was valid. The trial court's rulings spawn the following four 
issues for review: 
A. Did the trial court violate the Crawfords' right to due process under the federal 
and Utah constitutions by depriving them of property when they were not parties to the 
action until after their permit was judicially invalidated, and were never served with a 
summons, complaint, any pleadings relating to National's first Motion for Summary 
Judgment, or the order granting that motion? This question of law is reviewed for 
correctness and this Court accords no deference to the trial court's rulings. See Doelle v. 
Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176, 1178-79 (Utah 1989). This issue was raised in the trial court at R. 
86,90,93-94,292,305,330-31. 
B. Did the trial court err in denying the Crawfords' Motion to Reconsider, 
denying the Crawfords' Motion for Summary Judgment on their Counterclaim, and granting 
National's second Motion for Summary Judgment where the evidence presented after the 
Crawfords entered the case established, as a matter of law, that issuing National's Permit 
violated Section 17.68.160.C of the Murray City Zoning Ordinances? The standard of 
review applicable to rulings made on motions for summary judgment is one of correctness 
with no deference afforded to the trial court. See Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 
107 (Utah 1991). This issue was raised in the trial court at R. 86-87, 90-94, 292, 306-08, 
330-31. 
C. Did the trial court err in denying the Crawfords' Motion for Summary 
Judgment on their Counterclaim even though National did not produce admissible evidence, 
by affidavits or otherwise, identifying a genuine issue for trial? The standard of review 
applicable to rulings made on motions for summary judgment is one of correctness with no 
deference afforded to the trial court. $££ Winegar, 813 P.2d at 107. This issue was raised 
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in the trial court at R. 306. 
D. Did the trial court err in granting National's second Motion for Summary 
Judgment even though National failed to comply with Utah R. Civ. P. 56 or Utah Code Jud. 
Admin. R. 4-501 by failing to support its motion with a "Statement of Undisputed Material 
Facts," and failing to provide any support for the alleged facts underlying the motion by 
citation to any record evidence? The standard of review applicable to rulings made on 
motions for summary judgment is one of correctness with no deference afforded to the trial 
court. See Winegar, 813 P.2d at 107. This issue was raised in the trial court at R. 329. 
III. DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW 
The following the following statutory provisions and rules are determinative: 
A. U.S. Const., amend. XIV, §. See Addendum. 
B. Utah Const., art. 1, § 7. See Addendum. 
C. Utah R. Civ. P. 56. See Addendum. 
D. Utah Code Jud. Admin. R. 4-501. See Addendum. 
E. Section 17.68.160.C of the Murray City Zoning Ordinances. See Addendum. 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case involves two competing permits for the construction and maintenance of an 
outdoor advertising sign. The first was held by the Crawfords. The second permit was 
subsequently issued to National. Murray City zoning ordinances preclude both permits from 
coexisting. Thus, one permit must be invalidated. The trial court invalidated the Crawfords' 
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permit. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW 
National filed a Complaint on October 4, 1996, seeking a declaratory judgment that 
the Crawfords5 Permit was null and void. R. 1-9. Thereafter, National requested summary 
judgment on its declaratory relief claim. R. 20-31. Before the Crawfords were parties, the 
trial court granted summary judgment on December 6, 1996. R. 78-81. The trial court then 
denied the Crawfords' subsequent Motion to Reconsider. R. 85-95, 222-23. 
Later, National filed an Amended Complaint, adding the Crawfords as defendants and 
seeking injunctive relief against them. R. 214-21. The Crawfords answered and 
counterclaimed, asserting that their permit was valid and that National's Permit was invalid. 
R. 229-41. The Crawfords then requested summary judgement on their Counterclaim. R. 
259-93. The trial court denied that motion on October 14, 1997. R. 316-320. 
Subsequently, National filed a second Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing that 
not all issues had been resolved, that the Crawfords' Counterclaim should be dismissed with 
prejudice, and that the validity of the two permits had been resolved in the prior motions for 
summary judgment. R. 321-25. On March 31, 1998, the trial court granted National's 
motion, disposing of all remaining issues. R. 348-51. 
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
1. In December of 1974, National entered into a lease (the "Lease") which 
allowed it to construct and maintain an outdoor advertising sign on real property located at 
approximately 4982 South 300 West, Murray, Utah, along the 1-15 corridor (the "Property"). 
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R. 96-97. 
2. On January 6, 1995, the Crawfords, who were out of the country until the end 
of July of 1996, granted their son Brad Crawford a general power of attorney. R. 101-04. 
3. In December of 1995, Brad Crawford exercised that power of attorney and 
purchased the Property on behalf of his parents, who succeeded to the interests of the lessor 
under the Lease. R. 99 at f 5. 
4. Brad Crawford paid a premium for the Property because of the presence of an 
outdoor advertising sign site on the Property. See id. 
5. Paragraph 3 of the Lease provides that the Lease shall commence on February 
1, 1975, and continue for ten years. R. 96 at f 3. 
6. Paragraph 3 of the Lease further provides that the Lease shall continue for an 
additional ten years, and thereafter from year to year, unless terminated by the Lessor as of 
any subsequent anniversary of the Lease upon at least sixty days written notice. See id. 
7. Paragraph 9 of the Lease provides: 
In the event that the portion of the Lessor's property occupied by the 
Lessee's displays is to be improved by permanent construction or remodeling, 
as evidenced by a building permit, requiring the removal of the Lessee's 
displays, the Lessor may terminate this lease upon giving the Lessee ninety 
(90) days written notice of termination, together with a copy of the building 
permit, by registered mail to either the Lessee's Home Office or the Branch 
Office listed, and upon the Lessor's refunding to the Lessee the rent previously 
paid for the unexpired portion of this Lease beyond the termination date. The 
Lessee agrees to remove its displays within the 90 day period. 
R. 97 at If 9. 
8. Pursuant to paragraph 9 of the Lease, on April 23,1996, the Crawfords notified 
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National in writing that it was developing the Property and that National's sign must be 
removed. R. 278-79. 
9. As of June 10, 1996, National had not removed its sign. On that date, the 
Crawfords sent a second letter to National demanding removal of the sign so that the 
development of the Property could proceed. The Crawfords enclosed a copy of the building 
permit authorizing development of the Property. R. 280-81, 283. 
10. As of August 7, 1996, National had not removed its sign. On that date, the 
Crawfords sent a third letter to National demanding removal of the sign. The Crawfords 
enclosed a copy of the site plan for the development of the Property, though they were not 
required to do so. R. 286-288. 
11. On November 25, 1996, to avoid any argument that the Lease had not been 
terminated, Martin S. Tanner, an attorney for the Crawfords, notified National and its 
attorney in writing, pursuant to paragraph 3 of the Lease, that the Lease would be terminated 
as of February 1, 1997, the next anniversary date of the Lease. This notification gave 
National 67 days notice of termination. R. 275. 
12. Prior to terminating the Lease, on March 5, 1996, the Crawfords submitted an 
application to Murray City for a permit to erect an outdoor advertising sign on the Property. 
The application was granted and the Crawfords' Permit issued on March 29, 1996. R. 60 at 
H5;63. 
13. The Crawfords' Perimt was initially valid for 180 days, or until September 25, 
1996. However, it is Murray City's custom, practice and policy to extend the initial 180-day 
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p C I K :•' J f ' ' * .- • >•. • • ' - ^ T , ^Viy.lvr : 1996, 
' ^ CM\ followed this custom, practice and policy and granted a 180-day extension of 
the Crawfords' Perm.it. This extended the validity of the Crawfords' Permit for 180 days 
beyond Septembei J:\ r^u..,
 L,; - , ; „ ;.:.;:, 
On September Id. 1996. National represented to Murra\ Cit\ that the Lease 
would not expire during the lijuui iM)-da\ ;ik ,-i i,.v . lawioru^ rci:.. . :>.:-
..y • • ' luvt'.w.K'P • M ^
 n September lb, 
1996, after learning that the removal of National's sign and construction of the Crawfords5 
sign could occur within the time allowed by Murray City's Septembei .^ . r>vo extension, 
Murray i n\ lenibuiic. A . V 
%
 "cusi 5, 1996, \lurra\ Cit\ issued a second sign permit ("National's 
Permit") authorizing National to erect an outdoor advertising sign within 500 feet of where 
Murray C it; nau aUihoii/c\; inc L iuv\ ioiJ:» u ^*;^ .. , h 
16 '"h In in: i a;; Cit) "s zoning ordinances prohibits any off-premise advertising siiin 
from being constructed within a radius of 500 feet of another off-premise advertising sign. 
The signs authorized b\ the I rawtoiua ivrmn and .^u; _. t^ni ;, .. ,MCIHI^ MUM-.., 
as tli.it phrase is usnl ini mln" I"1 11111.m Cits 7oni)i)» Onlinanu '. IiYonstrueted according to the 
respective permits, the signs would be within 500 feet of each other. R. 6 at rr v & 32, 
Under Murray City Zoning Ordinances, one of the permits must be m\ alioaied. i ^ Section 
17.<>.v I (ill I ml iilii iMiiii.it l1it\ /UIIIIIJ. * liiiiiumvs i nn iiiiiinsl in ''iilnnuluni). • 
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17. In this regard, National applied for its permit on April 30, 1996. R. 65. 
However, the Crawfords applied for their permit on March 5, 1996, and the Crawfords' 
Permit was issued on March 29, 1996. R. 60 at If 5; 63. Thus, at the time Murray City issued 
National's Permit, the Crawfords held a valid permit that precluded the issuance of 
National's Permit. 
18. National filed a Complaint on October 4,1996, seeking a declaratory judgment 
that the Crawfords' Permit was null and void. However, the Crawfords were not served with 
a summons or a copy of the complaint, as evidenced by the lack of any return of service in 
the record. In fact, the Crawfords were not even named as defendants in that action. Rather, 
National named only Murray City as a defendant. R. 1-9. 
19. Murray City answered and counterclaimed for Interpleader, naming the 
Crawfords as parties and alleging: (1) that the Crawfords were the real party in interest 
because they stood to lose their vested interest in their permit; and (2) that Murray City was 
a neutral party who was not able to determine which permit was valid. R. 13-19. 
20. Although Murray City asked the Crawfords' counsel at the time to accept 
service of the Counterclaim for Interpleader, there is no admissible evidence in the record 
that the Crawfords' counsel agreed to do so and there is no signed Acceptance of Service 
in the record. Additionally, the Crawfords were not served with the relevant pleadings as 
required by Utah R. Civ. P. 4, as evidenced by the lack of any return of service in the record 
or any reference to the Crawfords or their attorney in the certificate of service. R. 19. 
21. Thereafter, National filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on its declaratory 
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with any summons or complaint), they were not served with a copy of the papers relating to 
the Motion for Summary Judgment, as evidenced by the lack of reference to the Crawfords 
or their attorney in the certificates o\ sen :,. :-. _ 
1V. VT ' • • -- -:-M served with National's Complaint, Murray 
City's Counterclaim, or the pleadings relevant to National's rm ilui, Ik- trial court granted 
National's Motion for Summary Judgment and ruled m^ .m. < iav\ io: m, renmt was mil1 . 
- ' ' •» * ' \\cnccd hv 
the lack of reference to the Crawfords or their attorney in the certificate of service. R. 81. 
2" Though not served, the Crawfords learned of the inai LOUII - . uhiiL the 
L raw iorUo nieu ,-. tiMiuu |iuintiii! nil! IIIIMI 
;'- ilvn* rermit had been entered in their absence. R. 85-95. The trial court denied 
that motion. R. 222-23. 
Subsequent! • ^i... • -. . . . ..:. - . 
i on plan1! ,i«i l • ,^ * > >mplamt. ' i ne trial court granted 
that motion on Februar\ 3, 19l,>~. R. 224-25. National's First Amended Complaini added 
the Crawfords as defendants and aougni injunctive icliel again^ mem. ,. -. . 1 
> • » * •• ^ m ! ^iHaimed i-^riir - *h..* -ivn permit 
was valid and that National's Permit was invalid. R. 229-41. 
26. The Crawfords then moved for summary judgement on ma; i ounterclaim 
basec, n
 t..,... ;<u. ^ -i. .! >* K> \ 
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27. The trial court denied the Crawfords' motion on October 14, 1997. R. 316-
320. 
28. Thereafter, National filed a second Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing 
that not all issues had been resolved, that the Crawfords' Counterclaim should be dismissed 
with prejudice, and that the validity of the two permits had already been resolved in the prior 
summary judgment motions. R. 321-25. 
29. National's memorandum in support of its second motion for summary 
judgment omitted a "Statement of Undisputed Material Facts" as required by Utah Code Jud. 
Admin. R. 4-501(2)(A). That pleading also omitted citation to any record evidence for its 
alleged facts, as required by Utah Code Jud. Admin. R. Rule 4-501 (2)(A) and Utah R. Civ. 
P. 56. See id. 
30. The Crawfords opposed National's second Motion for Summary Judgment by, 
among other things, informing the Court that "as indicated by the lack of any return of 
service in the Court's file, the Crawfords were never served with process in this case," that 
"as demonstrated by the mailing certificates on the pleadings filed by plaintiff in connection 
with its first motion for summary judgment, the Crawfords were never served with copies 
of any of those pleadings," and, therefore, that "the Crawfords had no involvement in this 
case until after the Court entered its order granting plaintiffs first motion for summary 
judgment." R. 330. 
31. On March 31, 1998, the trial court granted National's second Motion for 
Summary Judgement without a hearing. R. 348-51. 
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A. On rare occasions, either through oversight or otherwise, trial courts o\ erlook 
constitutional rights to due process. This is such a case. Before the Crawfords were parties 
to this case, and e\ en mougn r 
.,>t , p. w - • •,{) Court declared that the Crawfords'5 Permit was null and void. 
By doing so in the Crawfords' absence, the trial court swept aside the Crawfords' protected 
property interest without an opportunity i 
ui • • I-- • ik-u ^ ' --it due process of law. This 
unconstitutional ruling also is the basis for the trial court's: (1) denial of the Crawfords' 
Motion to Reconsider; (2) denial of the Crawford;* Motion ioi Summary Judgment on men 
Counieiv..!..:.. » "x * * • • ' • , 
•ihn: invalidating the Crawfords* Permit is based -ju uus pervasive underlying 
reversible error. Consequently, each ruling must be reversed. 
" Lftei joining this action, the Ci aw foi (is pi esei ited e v idence that pi ecli ide> i tl i * 
\r\\ a. :.:•' =:• - - T* * ^II -*- l *•- -. ^unimaiv invalidation) and established the invalidity 
of National's Perm.it as a matter of law. Ignoring this evidence, the trial court, without 
hearing, affirmed its i tiling on .\aiio;.«i ^ ; „t,i .../,.. . .. . • ,-; . ;> 
t ''• i • •• • • - M . n.inir-,-! \ itionaPs second Motion for Summary Judgment. Ihe 
trial court erred by ignoring the evidence and failing to grant summan judgment for the 
Crawfords, or at a minimum, ruiing that summary judgment foi :\;*iiv>na; was preclude.: by 
genuine, 11iiiK i iii! relics ol hu I. 
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C. The trial court erred in denying the Crawfords' Motion for Summary Judgment 
on their Counterclaim because National adduced no record evidence contrary to the evidence 
presented by the Crawfords. Rather, National simply rested on its pleadings and unsupported 
statements, some of which were contradicted by the record. National's "facts" (sheer 
allegations and unsupported and/or untrue statements) as a matter of law did not establish any 
genuine issues of material fact to preclude summary judgment for the Crawfords. 
Accordingly, the Crawfords are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on their counterclaim. 
D. The trial court erred in granting National's second Motion for Summary 
Judgment because, contrary to Utah R. Civ. P. 56 or Utah Code Jud. Admin. R. 4-501, 
National offered no "Statement of Undisputed Material Facts" or any support for National's 
alleged facts on which its motion hinged. The trial court's grant of National's unsupported 
motion constitutes reversible error. 
VI. ARGUMENT 
A. THE TRIAL COURT DEPRIVED THE CRAWFORDS OF A VESTED 
PROPERTY INTEREST WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW. 
The trial court committed constitutional error when it invalidated the Crawfords' 
Permit, by granting National's first Motion for Summary Judgment, in the Crawfords' 
absence. On this first fatally flawed ruling, the trial court based its subsequent denial of the 
Crawfords' Motion to Reconsider and the Crawfords' Motion for Summary Judgment on 
their Counterclaim, and its grant of National's second Motion for Summary Judgment. R. 
78-81, 316-20, 348-51. The trial court did so even though the Crawfords' were not parties 
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served with a Summons, the Complaint or the pleadings relating to Nationars first Motion 
for Summary Judgment... The trial court's rulings denied, the Crawfbrds due process and 
should be reversed. 
*- vides that "[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law." Utah Const, art, 1, § 7. Similar!}, the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United. States Constitution provides that no state snau uepr. x e ..m: | vi .^ »n 
. ' ' -~
v
 " ' • u^ ii^ .A_.,.Alurm\ 
Ld; Civil Service Comm'n, 949 r . - j .46, 752 (Utah Cr \ P P :l;'" ; ; his protection is 
%%
' <>\r. of our most important constitutional guarantees." .State in Interest of Summers v. 
u„.iienstein ;616I " 2< 1608,61 3(1 J" , lit ,. 15 8 1 ) 
The first step in due process analysis is the identification of some liberty or property 
interest held by the aggrieved party. See id, 616 P.2d at -10. The Utah. Supreme Court 
applies a tiexibie ueiinition ui
 t ;op.;v . . ;::<.• -.u^ pioceb:, -..^\. See Celebrit) Club un. 
•> w^4i..Mfc^^A^ii,.i^:jiu... . c > 2d 1293,1296-97 (Utah 1982). The Court has stated 
that property interests subject to due process guarantees "are not limited b\ a few rigid. 
technical forms. kuilier. "propeiu quotes a Diuaa range of mieie^: i:.,u u;^  >eeu 
ke\M.iu' ' :- '-*• - -i.!:- - * .u Pern \, binderma:^. 408 U.S. 593, 
601 (1972)). More recently, the Court observed that "property interests 'are created and their 









 ^ iloaru QI Ke^nu.N ,j\uii. -
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U.S. 564,577(1972)). 
Applying these standards, the Court has held that permits and/or licenses like those 
here are protected property interests. For example, in Celebrity Club Inc, 657 P.2d at 1293, 
this Court held that the operator of a state liquor store operated in a private club pursuant to 
a lease granted by the Utah Liquor Control Commission possessed a property interest in the 
lease to which constitutional due process protections applied. Similarly, the Court in 
Anderson v, Utah County Board of County Commissioners, 589 P.2d 1214 (Utah 1979), the 
Court found that the plaintiff held a "substantial property interest" in the expected renewal 
of the licensing of his business which entitled him to constitutional due process protections, 
explaining: 
The spirit of enterprise which impels a person to initiate and develop a 
business which provides services to the public and employment for others is 
vital to the common welfare. By the same token that a business must operate 
in accordance with lawful regulations and requirements, it should be the policy 
of the law, and of officials charged with its administration, the encourage such 
initiative and enterprise by according it all proper protections of the law. 
Id. at 1216. The Court continued, stating: 
[I]nasmuch as the licensing of his business does represent a substantial 
property interest to plaintiff, which also has its effect upon the public welfare, 
it should not be destroyed or disrupted arbitrarily, nor without following 
fundamental standards of due process of law to guard against capricious or 
oppressive administrative action. 
Id. at 1216. 
Under these principles, the Crawfords Permit was a vested, protected property interest. 
The permit entitled the Crawfords to erect an outdoor advertising sign on the Property and 
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to sell space on that sign to advertisers. In essence, the Crawfords' Permit granted a right to 
run an outdoor advertising business on the Property. Such a business can be very lucrative. 
Indeed, the Property is located along 1-15 and, therefore, is visible to tens of thousands, if not 
hundreds of thousands, of motorists every day. Business owners will pay substantial sums 
of money to owners of outdoor advertising signs located along 1-15 for advertising space. 
That is why Brad Crawford paid a premium for the Property. R. 99 at J^ 5. Additionally, 
because Murray City zoning ordinaces require outdoor adverting signs to be constructed at 
least 500 feet apart, the number of permitsissued is limited. Accordingly, the Crawfords, like 
the plaintiffs in Celebrity Club Inc. and Anderson, hold a protected property interest in their 
outdoor advertising permit to which constitutional due process protections apply. 
After establishing a property interest like the Crawfords', the next step in due process 
analysis is to determine what process is due before that interest can be impaired. &££ 
Wulffenstein, 616 P.2d at 610. This Court has stated that "'[t]he purpose of due process is 
to prevent fundamental unfairness.'" State v. Parker, 872 P.2d 1041, 1048 (Utah Ct. App.), 
cert, denied, 883 P.2d 1359 (1994) (quoting State v. Maestas. 815 P.2d 1319, 1325 (UtahCt. 
App. 1991), csrt. denied, 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1992)). The Utah Supreme Court has 
elaborated on that holding and explained the due process guarantee this way: 
[N] either a court nor other judicial tribunal may deny a person a constitutional 
right or deprive such person of a vested interest in property without any 
opportunity to be heard. To do so constitutes taking of property without due 
process of law." 
Celebrity Club Inc.. 657 P.2d at 1296 (quoting Hailing v. Industrial Comm'n of Utah, 71 
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Utah 112, 125, 263 P. 78, 82 (1927)). The Court continued by noting: 
Many attempts have been made to further define udue process" but they all 
resolve into the thought that a party shall have his day in court—that is each 
party shall have the right to a hearing before a competent court, with the 
privilege of being heard and introducing evidence to establish his cause of his 
defense, after which comes judgment upon the record thus made. 
Id. (quoting Christiansen v, Harris, 109 Utah 1, 6-7,163 P.2d 314, 316 (1945)). The Court 
concluded, stating that "the essential requirement of due process is that every citizen be 
afforded his 'day in court,"' adding that "'[i]t has always been the policy of our law to 
resolve doubts in favor of permitting parties to have their day in court on the merits of a 
controversy."' Id. (quoting Carman v. Slavens, 546 P.2d 601, 603 (Utah 1976)). 
The Crawfords were deprived of due process, as defined in Celebrity Club Inc. 
Indeed, National requested that the Crawfords' Permit be declared null and void in its 
Complaint filed on October 4, 1996. However, the Crawfords were not served with a 
summons or a copy of the complaint. R. 1-9 (evidencing no return of service). The 
Craw fords were not even named then as defendants. National named only Murray City as 
a defendant. Id. 
Only when Murray City answered and countercl aimed for Interpleader were the 
Crawfords named as parties. Murray City alleged: (1) that the Crawfords were the real party 
in interest because they stood to lose their vested interest in their permit; and (2) that Murray 
City was a neutral party who was not able to determine which permit was valid. R. 13-19. 
Although Murray City initially asked the Crawfords' counsel at the time to accept service of 
the Counterclaim for Interpleader, there is no admissible evidence in the record that the 
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Crawfords' counsel agreed to do so and there is no signed Acceptance of Service in the 
record. Additionally, the Crawfords were not served with the relevant pleadings as required 
by Utah R. Civ. P. 4, as evidenced by the lack of any return of service in the record or any 
reference to the Crawfords or their attorney in the certificate of service. R. 19. 
Thereafter, National filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on its declaratory relief 
claim. R. 20-31. Because the Crawfords were not parties (they had not been served with any 
summons or complaint), they were not served with a copy of the papers relating to the 
Motion for Summary Judgment. R. 21,28 (evidencing no reference to the Crawfords or their 
attorney in the certificates of service). 
Though the Crawfords were not served with National's Complaint, Murray City's 
Counterclaim, or the pleadings relevant to National's motion, the trial court granted 
National's Motion for Summary Judgment and ruled that the Crawfords' Permit was null and 
void. R. 78-81. The Crawfords were not served with a copy of this order, as evidenced by 
the lack of reference to the Crawfords or their attorney in the certificate of service. R. 81. 
Though not served, the Crawfords learned of the trial court's ruling. The Crawfords filed a 
Motion to Reconsider, pointing out, among other things, that the order nullifying their permit 
had been entered in their absence. R. 85-95. The trial court denied that motion. R. 222-23. 
Subsequently, National filed a Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint and 
a proposed First Amended Complaint. R. 210-21. The trial court granted that motion on 
February 3, 1997. R. 224-25. National's First Amended Complaint added the Crawfords as 
defendants and sought injunctive relief against them. R. 214-21. The Crawfords filed 
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answered and counterclaimed, asserting that their permit was valid and that National's Permit 
was invalid. R. 229-41. The Crawfords then moved for summary judgement on their 
Counterclaim based, in part, on the facts set forth above. R. 259-93. The trial court denied 
the Crawfords' motion on October 14, 1997. R. 316-320. 
Thereafter, National filed a second Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing that not 
all issues had been resolved, that the Crawfords' Counterclaim should be dismissed with 
prejudice, and that the validity of the two permits had already been resolved in the prior 
summary judgment motions. R. 321-25. The Crawfords opposed National's second Motion 
for Summary Judgment by, among other things, informing the Court that "as indicated by the 
lack of any return of service in the Court's file, the Crawfords were never served with 
process in this case," that "as demonstrated by the mailing certificates on the pleadings filed 
by plaintiff in connection with its first motion for summary judgment, the Crawfords were 
never served with copies of any of those pleadings," and, therefore, that "the Crawfords had 
no involvement in this case until after the Court entered its order granting plaintiffs first 
motion for summary judgment." R. 330. On March 31, 1998, the trial court granted 
National's second Motion for Summary Judgement without a hearing. R. 348-51. 
In sum, the Crawfords never received their day in Court. Before the Crawfords were 
parties, and even though the Crawfords' Permit is a vested property interest subject to due 
process protection, the trial court declared that the Crawfords' Permit was null and void. By 
doing so in the Crawfords' absence, the trial court swept aside the Crawfords' protected 
property interest without an opportunity to heard. In other words, granting National's first 
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Motion for Summary Judgment constitutes a taking of property without due process of law. 
See Celebrity Club Inc., 657 P.2d at 1296 (quoting Hailing, 71 Utah at 125, 263 P. at 82). 
This unconstitutional ruling subsequently formed the basis for the trial court's: (1) denial of 
the Crawfords' Motion to Reconsider; (2) denial of the Crawfords' Motion for Summary 
Judgment on their Counterclaim; and (3) granting of National's second Motion for Summary 
Judgment. Each trial court ruling invalidating the Crawfords' Permit is based on this 
pervasive underlying reversible error. Consequently, each ruling must be reversed. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO GRANT SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT FOR THE CRAWFORDS, OR AT A MINIMUM, RULING 
THAT SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR NATIONAL WAS PRECLUDED 
BY GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT, 
Despite their absence, and despite not being served with the pleadings and order 
related to National's first Motion for Summary Judgment, the Crawfords learned that the trial 
court granted National's first motion. Thereafter, the Crawfords filed two motions in which 
they presented evidence that precluded the summary invalidation of their permit and 
mandated the invalidation of National's Permit. Ignoring that evidence, the trial court 
affirmed its ruling on National's first Motion for Summary Judgment, denied the Crawfords' 
two motions, and granted a second Motion for Summary Judgment filed by National. The 
trial court's failure to consider the evidence presented by the Crawfords provides a second 
basis for reversal. 
Indeed, the evidence presented by the Crawfords subsequent to the trial court's initial 
nullification of their permit established the following: In December of 1974, National entered 
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the Lease. R. 96-97. On January 6, 1995, the Crawfords, who were out of the country until 
the end of July of 1996, granted their son Brad Crawford a general power of attorney. R. 
101-04. In December of 1995, Brad Crawford exercised that power of attorney and 
purchased the Property on behalf of his parents, who succeeded to the interests of the lessor 
under the Lease. R. 99 at f^ 5. Brad Crawford paid a premium for the Property because of 
the presence of an outdoor advertising sign site on the Property. See id. 
Paragraph 3 of the Lease provides that the Lease shall commence on February 1, 
1975, and continue for ten years. R. 96 at ^  3. Paragraph 3 of the Lease further provides that 
the Lease shall continue for an additional ten years, and thereafter from year to year, unless 
terminated by the Lessor as of any subsequent anniversary of the Lease upon at least sixty 
days written notice. See id. 
Paragraph 9 of the Lease provides: 
In the event that the portion of the Lessor's property occupied by the 
Lessee's displays is to be improved by permanent construction or remodeling, 
as evidenced by a building permit, requiring the removal of the Lessee's 
displays, the Lessor may terminate this lease upon giving the Lessee ninety 
(90) days written notice of termination, together with a copy of the building 
permit, by registered mail to either the Lessee's Home Office or the Branch 
Office listed, and upon the Lessor's refunding to the Lessee the rent previously 
paid for the unexpired portion of this Lease beyond the termination date. The 
Lessee agrees to remove its displays within the 90 day period. 
R. 97 at Tf 9. Pursuant to paragraph 9 of the Lease, on April 23, 1996, the Crawfords notified 
National in writing that it was developing the Property and that National's sign must be 
removed. R. 278-79. As of June 10,1996, National had not removed its sign. On that date, 
the Crawfords sent a second letter to National demanding removal of the sign so that the 
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development of the Property could proceed. The Crawfords enclosed a copy of the building 
permit authorizing development of the Property. R. 280-81, 283. As of August 7, 1996, 
National had not removed its sign. On that date, the Crawfords sent a third letter to National 
demanding removal of the sign. The Crawfords enclosed a copy of the site plan for the 
development of the Property, though they were not required to do so. R. 286-288. In other 
words, the evidence presented by the Crawfords after they joined this matter established that 
the Crawfords complied fully with paragraph 9 of the Lease. Consequently, the evidence 
before the trial court established that the Lease was terminated pursuant to paragraph 9 of the 
Lease as of July 29, 1996. 
Even if termination on this ground was found to be ineffective (and it was effective), 
the evidence presented by the Crawfords established that the lease was properly terminated 
by another means. On November 25, 1996, to avoid any argument that the Lease had not 
been terminated, Martin S. Tanner, an attorney for the Crawfords, notified National and its 
attorney in writing, pursuant to paragraph 3 of the Lease, that the Lease would be terminated 
as of February 1, 1997, the next anniversary date of the Lease. This notification gave 
National 67 days notice of termination. R. 275. Accordingly, the evidence before the trial 
court indicated that the Crawfords terminated the Lease pursuant to paragraph 3 effective 
Feoruary 1, 1997. 
Prior to terminating the Lease, on March 5, 1996, the Crawfords submitted an 
application to Murray City for a permit to erect an outdoor advertising sign on the Property. 
The application was granted and the Crawfords' Permit issued on March 29, 1996. R. 60 at 
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Tf 5; 63. The Crawfords' Perimt was initially valid for 180 days, or until September 25, 
1996. On September 3, 1996, Murray City followed this custom, practice and policy and 
granted a 180-day extension of the Crawfords' Permit. R. 106, 107, 276-77. This extended 
the validity of the Crawfords' Permit for 180 days beyond September 25, 1996, or until 
March 24, 1997. No contrary evidence was introduced. 
On September 10, 1996, National represented to Murray City that the Lease would 
not expire during the initial 180-day life of the Crawfords' Permit. Based on that 
representation, Murray City rescinded the Crawfords' Permit. However, on September 18, 
1996, after learning that the removal of National's sign and construction of the Crawfords' 
sign could occur within the time allowed by Murray City's September 3, 1996 extension, 
Murray City understandably reinstated the Crawfords' Permit. R. 61 at ^ 12 & 13. 
On August 5, 1996, Murray City issued a second sign permit ("National's Permit") 
authorizing National to erect an outdoor advertising sign within 500 feet of where Murray 
City had authorized the Crawfords to construct a sign. R. 60-61 at fflf 8 & 9. Murray City's 
zoning ordinances prohibit any off-premise advertising sign from being constructed within 
a radius of 500 feet of another off-premise advertising sign. See Section 17.68.160.C of the 
Murray City Zoning Ordinances (included in Addendum). The signs authorized by the 
Crawfords' Permit and National's Permit are off-premise signs, as that phrase is used in the 
Murray City Zoning Ordinances. If constructed according to the respective permits, the signs 
would be within 500 feet of each other. R. 6 at fflf 31 & 32. Under Murray City Zoning 
Ordinances, one of the permits must be invalidated. In this regard, National applied for its 
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permit on April 30,1996. R. 65. However, the Crawfords applied for their permit on March 
5, 1996, and the Crawfords5 Permit was issued on March 29, 1996. R. 60 at t 5; 63. Thus, 
at the time Murray City issued National's Permit, the Crawfords held a valid permit that 
precluded the issuance of National's Permit. 
In sum, after joining this action, the Crawfords presented evidence that precluded 
invalidation of their permit (much less summary invalidation) and established the invalidity 
of National's Permit as a matter of law. Ignoring this evidence, the trial court, without a 
hearing, affirmed its ruling on National's First Motion for Summary Judgment, and denied 
the Crawfords' two motions and granted National's second Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The trial court erred by not acknowledging the evidence and failing to grant summary 
judgment for the Crawfords, or at a minimum, ruling that summary judgment for National 
was precluded by genuine, material issues of fact. 
C. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING THE CRAWFORDS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THEIR 
COUNTERCLAIM BECAUSE NATIONAL ADDUCED NO RECORD 
EVIDENCE CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE 
CRAWFORDS. 
In support of their Motion for Summary Judgment on their Counterclaim, the 
Crawfords presented evidence establishing that their permit was valid and that National's 
Permit was invalid. R. 259-93. In response, National presented no contrary evidence by 
affidavit of otherwise, as required by Utah R. Civ. P. 56 and Utah Code Jud. Admin. R. 4-
501. Rather, National improperly rested on conclusory allegations and denials of its 
pleadings. Despite this, the trial court erroneously denied the Crawfords' motion. 
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The Crawfords demonstrated, through documents and affidavits, that they are entitled 
to summary judgment because, as a matter of law, National's Permit should never have been 
granted. R. 259-93. Consequently, to preclude summary judgment for the Crawfords, 
National was required to establish a genuine disputed material fact through admissible 
evidence. Indeed, as noted by Utah R. Civ. P. 56, "[w]hen a motion for summary judgment 
is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon mere 
allegations or denials of his pleadings, but his response, by affidavit or as otherwise provided 
in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." A 
cursory review of National's opposing memorandum reveals that National did exactly what 
Rule 56 precludes. National did not set forth specific facts by affidavits or otherwise 
showing the existence of a genuine issue. Rather, National simply rested upon unsupported 
allegations and denials of its pleadings. R. 294-99. Thus, Rule 56 mandated that summary 
judgment for the Crawfords be granted. Indeed, that rule states that if a party opposing 
summary judgment does not satisfy the burden imposed by Rule 56, summary judgment 
"shall be entered against him." Sfi£ Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e) (emphasis added). Despite the 
clear mandate of Rule 56, the trial court denied the Crawfords' motion, thereby committing 
reversible error. R. 318-320. 
National half-heartedly attempted to satisfy its Rule 56 burden by arguing (again 
without supporting evidence) that the Crawfords' could not terminate the Lease under 
paragraph 9 because they did not submit a building permit. R. 297. National's unsupported 
assertion was is simply false. The evidence of record indicates that prior to terminating the 
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Lease, the Crawfords forwarded a copy of the building permit to National pursuant to 
Paragraph 9 of the Lease. R. 280-81, 283. The Crawfords pointed this out to the trial court, 
as well as the fact that National had submitted no evidence to the contrary. R. 306-307. 
Thus, it was undisputed that the Crawfords effectively terminated the Lease on July 29,1996 
pursuant to paragraph 9 of the Lease. 
National also argued (also without citation to evidence) that the Crawfords' Permit 
was invalid because the Crawfords could not erect their sign before the expiration of their 
permit. This unsupported argument is also false. The Crawfords' presented evidence that 
their permit was valid until March 24, 1997. R. 106, 107, 276-77. National did not dispute 
this fact. And, as noted above, the Crawfords presented evidence establishing that the Lease 
was terminated, at the latest, effective February 1, 1997, pursuant to paragraph 3 of the 
Lease. R. 275. 
Thus, according to undisputed evidence, National was under a legal obligation to 
remove its sign on or before February 1, 1997. Because the Crawfords' Permit was valid 
until March 24,1997, the Crawfords had at least two months after the date on which National 
was obligated to remove its sign to construct their own. Consequently, contrary to National's 
bald assertion, the evidence proved that the Crawfords could erect their sign within the time 
limit allowed by their permit. This evidence also was apparently ignored. R. 303-12. 
In sum, National's failure to adduce contrary admissible evidence and reliance solely 
upon mere allegations and unsupported statements could not establish the existence of any 
genuine issues of material fact to preclude summary judgment for the Crawfords. 
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Accordingly, the Crawfords were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on their 
counterclaim. In denying the motion, the trial court committed reversible error. 
D. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING NATIONAL'S SECOND 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE, CONTRARY TO 
UTAH R. CIV. P. 56 OR UTAH CODE JUD. ADMIN. R. 4-501, 
NATIONAL OFFERED NO "STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED 
MATERIAL FACTS" OR ANY SUPPORT FOR NATIONAL'S 
ALLEGED FACTS ON WHICH ITS MOTION HINGED. 
After the trial court denied the Crawfords' Motion for Summary Judgment on their 
Counterclaim, National filed a second Motion for Summary Judgment. National did not 
support that motion with a "Statement of Undisputed Material Facts" as required by Rule 4-
501(2)(A) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. R. 323-25. Nor did National provide 
any support for the alleged facts underlying the motion by citation to any record evidence as 
required by Rule 4-501 (2)(A) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration and Rule 56 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See id. As a result, National did not establish any 
properly supported undisputed facts in support of its second Motion for Summary Judgment. 
This deficiency was brought to the Court's attention by the Crawfords. R. 328-31. 
Notwithstanding National's failures to establish entitlement to summary judgment, the trial 
court granted National's motion. Clearly, the trial court's action in this regard constitutes 
reversible error. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The protection against the deprivation of property without due process is one of this 
nation's most important constitutional guarantees. The trial court ignored this cornerstone 
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of our judicial system by invalidating the Crawfords5 Permit in the Crawfords' absence. 
Subsequent to this summary invalidation of their permit, the Crawfords presented evidence 
that precluded nullification of their permit and mandated invalidation of National's Permit. 
National offered nothing to contradict that evidence but mere allegations and unsupported 
statements, some of which were simply untrue. The trial court ignored National's failures 
in this regard, affirmed its prior ruling, and a second, unsupported Motion for Summary 
Judgment filed by National. From the foregoing, it is clear that the Crawfords have never 
received their day in court. Indeed, the trial court never gave the evidence presented by the 
Crawfords a cursory review, let alone the type of fair and serious review required by the Utah 
and federal constitutions. This Court should remedy this denial of due process by, at the very 
least, reversing the trial court's rulings invaliding the Crawfords' Permit, including its grant 
of National's first Motion for Summary Judgment, denial of the Crawfords' Motion to 
Reconsider, and grant of National's second Motion for Summary Judgment. Additionally, 
the record provides this Court with ample support for going one step further and reversing 
the trial court's denial of the Crawfords' Motion for Summary Judgment on their 
Counterclaim. 
DATED this 30th day of November, 1998. 
DURHAM, EVANS, JONES & PINEGAR 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN MID FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
NATIONAL ADVERTISING COMPANY, : 
PLAINTIFF : 
vs. : 
MURRAY CITY CORPORATION, : 
et al, : 
DEFENDANT(S) : 
MINUTE ENTRY RULING 
CASE NO. 960906952 CV 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
Date: February 25, 1998 
After review of the 'pleadings and upon receipt of the Notice 
to Submit (Plaintiffs Motion .for Summary Judgment) filed February 
18, J.998, the Court rules as follows: 
1. Given plaintifffs February^ , 17, 1998 Withdrawal of Notice to 
Submit, the minute entry Tuling of February 18
 # 1998 is herewith 
set aside. 
2. Plaintiff fs Motion>for Summary Judgment is granted for the 
reasons specified in the supporting memoranda. 
3. Counsel for plaintiff to prepare the order and judgment* 
^Case No: 960906952 CV 
Certificate of Mailing 
I certify that on the ^^day of F&K \ 1992, I sent by 
first class mail a true and correct copy of the attached document 
to the following: 
^Donald L. Dalton 
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pjo. *BOX 45340 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0340 
R. Stephen Marshall 
Steve K. Gordon 
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Salt Lake City, UT 84144 
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VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
Donald L. Dalton (4305) 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
Post Office Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0340 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
Facsimile: (801) 534-0058 
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MURRAY CITY CORPORATION, a Utah 
municipality, GENE V. CRAWFORD, 
SHERRY T. CRAWFORD dba Val-Dev, 
L.L.C., 
Defendants. 
AND RELATED CROSS ACTION, THIRD 
PARTY ACTION AND COUNTERCLAIM 
ORDER & JUDGMENT 
Case No. 960906952 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment came on before the Court pursuant to Notice 
to Submit filed Febntan IM, 1998. Given plaintiffs withdrawal of its previous Notice to 
Submit (February 12,1998), the minute entry ruling of February 18,1998 is herewith set 
aside. For reasons specified in the Menu w .u \>. 1' 1111 in Support of plaintiffs Motion for 
1 
Summary Judgment, good cause appearing therefor, it is hereby 
ORDERED that plaintiffs motion for summary judgment is granted. 
AND FURTHER ORDERED THAT the counterclaim of defendants Gene V. 
Crawford & Sherry T. Crawford dba Val-Dev, L.L.C. (the "Crawfords") is dismissed with 
prejudice. 
AND FURTHER ORDERED THAT all remaining claims, of defendants against 
plaintiff are dismissed with prejudice. 
AND FURTHER ORDERED THAT because the Crawford's cross-claim against 
defendant Murray City is based on the same allegations and facts as their counterclaim; and 
because Murray City has agreed to abide by the Court's ruling regarding the validity of the 
two permits at issue in this case, the Court hereby grants summary judgment in Murray City's 
favor on the Crawford's cross-claim. 
AND FURTHER ORDERED THAT plaintiffs claim for damages against the 
Crawfords (in the First Amended Complaint) is dismissed with prejudice. 
AND FURTHER ORDERED THAT each party shall bear its own attorney's fees & 
legal expenses. 
AND, FINALLY, ADJUDGED THAT Permit No. 15006, issued by Murray City to 
plaintiff, is valid in all respects. 
2 
M DATED this ^f^day of March, 1998. 
Judge J. 
Third 3 ud: 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 2S*£day of March, 1998,1 caused to be mailed, first class, 
postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER & JUDGMENT, to: 
R. Stephen Marshall 
Steve K. Gordon 
Durham, Evans, Jones & Pinegar 
50 South Main, Suite 850 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Martin S. Tanner 
Howe & Tanner 
340 Broadway Centre 
111 East Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-5250 
Randy B. Hart 
Asst. Murray City Attorney 
5025 South State 
P.O. Box 57520 
Murray, Utah 84157 
4 
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R. Stephen Marshall (2097) 
Steve K. Gordon (5958) 
DURHAM, EVANS, JONES & PINEGAR, P.C. 
50 South Main Street, Suite 850 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Telephone: (801) 538-2424 
Facsimile: (801)538-2425 
Martin S. Tanner (4419) 
HOWE & TANNER 
340 Broadway Centre 
111 East Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-5250 
Telephone: (801) 575-7100 
Attorneys for Defendants Gene V. Crawford and 
Sherry T. Crawford 
FILED 
MO TiH> ' l 
.. ..."curr COURT 
SALT 
II! Illl I lllltlt IHhK'IM DISTRICT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
NATIONAL ADVERTISING COMPANY, 
a Delaware Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
MURRAY CITY CORPORATION, a Utah 
municipality, GENE V. CRAWFORD, 
SHERRY T. CRAWFORD, dba VAL-DEV, 
L.L.C. 
Defendants. 
MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME 
BY WHICH DEFENDANTS GENE 
CRAWFORD AND SHERRY 
CRAWFORD MUST FILE A NOTICE 
OF APPEAL 
Civil No. 960906952CV 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
Pursuant to Rule 4(e) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, defendants Gene V. 
Crawford and Sherry T. Crawford (the "Crawfords"), through thru undersigned counsel, respectfully 
request that this Court extend the time by which the Crawfords must file their Notice of Appeal until 
g:skg\crawford\pleadings\motionfor extension of time 
May 30, 1998, or 10 days from the date of entry of an order granting this motion, which ever occurs 
later. The Crawfords' motion, which will be unopposed, is supported by the Court's file in this 
matter and by the accompanying memorandum. 
DATED this 11th day of May, 1998. 
DURHAM, EVANS, JONES & PINEGAR, P.C. 
''^Stephen Marshall 
Steve K. Gordon 
Attorneys for Defendants Gene V. Crawford 
and Sherry T. Crawford 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 11th day of May, 1998,1 caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME BY WHICH DEFENDANTS GENE 
CRAWFORD AND SHERRY CRAWFORD MUST FILE A NOTICE OF APPEAL 
to be hand-delivered to the following: 
Donald L.Dalton, Esq. 
Bradley R. Cahoon, Esq. 
VAN COTT, B AGLEY, CORNWALL 
& MCCARTHY 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
Post Office Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
and mailed in the U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid, to: 
Randy B.Hart, Esq. 
Assistant Murray City Attorney 
5025 South State Street 
Post Office Box 57520 
Murray Utah, 84157 
^ L -
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R. Stephen Marshall (2097) 
Steve K. Gordon (5958) 
DURHAM, EVANS, JONES & PINEGAR, P.C. 
50 South Main Street, Suite 850 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Telephone: (801)538-2424 
Facsimile: (801) 538-2425 
Martin S. Tanner (4419) 
HOWE & TANNER 
340 Broadway Centre 
111 East Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-5250 
Telephone: (801) 575-7100 
Attorneys for Defendants Gene V. Crawford and 
Sherry T. Crawford 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
NATIONAL ADVERTISING COMPANY, 
a Delaware Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
MURRAY CITY CORPORATION, a Utah 
municipality, GENE V. CRAWFORD, 
SHERRY T. CRAWFORD, dba VAL-DEV, 
L.L.C. 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME 
BY WHICH DEFENDANTS GENE 
CRAWFORD AND SHERRY 
CRAWFORD MUST FILE A NOTICE 
OF APPEAL 
Civil No. 960906952CV 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
Pursuant to Rule 4(e) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, defendants Gene V. 
Crawford and Sherry T. Crawford (the "Crawfords"), through their undersigned counsel, respectfully 
c ? r * ••' n; 
CL'-'r K Or T •" ^ 
S A L T L A K L L - ; 
CJJiT COURT 
' A R T H L N T 
g:skg\erawford\picadings\extension of time memo 
submit the following Memorandum in Support of Motion for Extension of Time by Which 
Defendants Gene Crawford and Sherry Crawford must File a Notice of Appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
Rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure states, in pertinent part, that a litigant 
must file a notice of appeal '"within 30 days after the entry of the judgment or order appealed from." 
Utah R. App. P. 4(e). The extension of that 30-day period is governed by Rule 4(e) of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. That Rule states: 
The trial court, upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause, may extend the 
time for filing a notice of appeal upon motion filed not later than 30 days after the 
expiration of the time prescribed by paragraph (a) of this rule No extension shall 
exceed 30 days past the prescribed time or 10 days from the date of entry of the order 
granting the motion, whichever occurs later. 
Utah R. App. P. 4(e). The extension of time allowed by Rule 4(e) is appropriate in this case. 
Indeed, on February 25,1998, this Court issued a Minute Entry Ruling in which it granted 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, thereby disposing of all of the issues in this matter. See 
Exhibit A. That minute entry indicated that counsel for plaintiff was to prepare an appropriate order 
and judgment See id. Plaintiffs counsel did so and mailed a draft to counsel for the Crawfords on 
March 12, 1998. See Exhibit B at 3. Thereafter, counsel for the Crawfords caused a letter to be 
hand-delivered to plaintiffs counsel, in which he stated the Crawfords' objections to the proposed 
order. See Exhibit C. On March 24,1998, plaintiffs counsel mailed an amended proposed order 
to counsel for the Crawfords. See Exhibit D at 4. The amended proposed order incorporated most 
of the changes suggested by counsel for the Crawfords in his prior letter. See id. Thereafter, on 
March 18, 1998, apparently unaware that an amended proposed order had been submitted by 
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plaintiffs counsel, the Court signed the initial order. See Exhibit B. Subsequently, on March 31, 
1998, the Court signed the amended order. See Exhibit D. 
As a result of the foregoing, two orders granting plaintiffs motion for summary judgment 
currently exist. The parties agree that the March 31,1998 is the appropriate order.l Thus, the parties 
agree that the date by which the Crawfords had to file a Notice of Appeal was April 30, 1998. 
However, counsel for the Crawfords was not aware that the March 31,1998 order had been signed 
until May 11,1998; eleven days after the expiration of the 30-day deadline. This delay occurred 
because this Court recently relocated to its current building during the time period in question and, 
during the move and resulting transition period, counsel for the Crawfords could not make contact 
with the court to check on the status of the order for quite some time, despite repeated attempts to 
do so. The Crawfords' counsel finally did make contact with the Court on May 11, 1998. Upon 
learning that the order had been signed by the Court on March 31,1998, counsel for the Crawfords 
immediately contacted plaintiffs counsel to discuss how best to obtain the necessary extension of 
time. It was agreed that the Crawfords's counsel would file the motion that is the subject of this 
memorandum and that plaintiffs counsel would not oppose the motion. On that same day, the 
Crawfords' counsel filed the necessary motion and this memorandum. 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the short period of time that has transpired since the expiration of the 30-day 
deadline, the reasons for that short delay, the fact that the Crawfords' counsel took immediate action 
after learning of the problem, and the fact that plaintiffs counsel has stated that he will not oppose 
Counsel for the Crawfords represents that he discussed this matter with plaintiff's counsel in his office on May 
11, 1998 and that they both agreed that the March 31, 1998 order is the appropriate order. 
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the Crawfords' motion, the Crawfords respectfully submit that extending the period of time within 
which they must file their Notice of Appeal is appropriate. Based on the foregoing, the Crawfords 
respectfully request that this Court extend the time by which the Crawfords must file their Notice 
of Appeal until May 30,1998, or 10 days from the date of entry of an order granting this motion, 
which ever occurs later. 
DATED this 11th day of May, 1998. 
DURHAM, EVANS, JONES & PINEGAR, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendants Gene V. Crawford 
and Sherry T. Crawford 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 11* day of May, 1998,1 caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME BY 
WHICH DEFENDANTS GENE CRAWFORD AND SHERRY CRAWFORD MUST FILE 
A NOTICE OF APPEAL 
to be hand-delivered to the following: 
Donald L.Dalton, Esq. 
Bradley R. Cahoon, Esq. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL 
& MCCARTHY 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
Post Office Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
and mailed in the U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid, to: 
Randy B. Hart, Esq. 
Assistant Murray City Attorney 
5025 South State Street 
Post Office Box 57520 
Murray Utah, 84157 
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R. Stephen Marshall (2097) 
Steve K. Gordon (5958) 
DURHAM, EVANS, JONES & PINEGAR, P.C. 
50 South Main Street, Suite 850 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Telephone: (801) 538-2424 
Facsimile: (801) 538-2425 
MartinS. Tanner (4419) 
HOWE & TANNER 
340 Broadway Centre 
111 East Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-5250 
Telephone: (801) 575-7100 
Attorneys for Defendants Gene V. Crawford and 
Sherry T. Crawford 
FILED DiSTRiCT COUR1 
Third Judicial District 
MAY I 2 1998 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
NATIONAL ADVERTISING COMPANY, 
a Delaware Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
MURRAY CITY CORPORATION, a Utah 
municipality, GENE V. CRAWFORD, 
SHERRY T. CRAWFORD, dba VAL-DEV, 
L.L.C. 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 
EXTENSION OF TIME BY WHICH 
DEFENDANTS GENE CRAWFORD 
AND SHERRY CRAWFORD MUST 
FILE A NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Civil No. 960906952CV 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
Based on the motion of defendants Gene V. Crawford and Sherry T. Crawford (the 
'Crawfords"), and good cause appearing therefor, the Court ORDERS that the time by which the 
g skg\crawford\pleadings\extension of time memo 
Crawfords must file their Notice of Appeal is hereby extended until May 30, 1998, or 10 days from 
the date of this Order, which ever occurs later. 
DATED this /jjky of May, 1998. 
By the Court: 
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R. Stephen Marshall (2097) 
Steve K. Gordon (5958) 
DURHAM, EVANS, JONES & PINEGAR, P.C. 
50 South Main Street, Suite 850 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Telephone: (801) 538-2424 
Facsimile: (801)538-2425 
Martin S. Tanner (4419) 
HOWE & TANNER 
340 Broadway Centre 
111 East Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-5250 
Telephone: (801)575-7100 
Attorneys for Defendants Gene V. Crawford and 
Sherry T. Crawford 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
NATIONAL ADVERTISING COMPANY, 
a Delaware Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
MURRAY CITY CORPORATION, a Utah 
municipality, GENE V. CRAWFORD, 
SHERRY T. CRAWFORD, dba VAL-DEV, 
L.L.C. 
Defendants. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Civil No. 960906952CV 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
Notice is hereby given that defendants and appellants Gene V. Crawford and Sherry T. 
Crawford (the "Crawfords'*) appeal to the Utah Supreme Court from the final judgment of the Third 
HUD 
Cr 'k:h] 
g:skg\crawford\pleadings\notice of appeal 
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, which was 
filed in this matter on March 31, 1998.1 The appeal is taken from the entire judgment. 
DATED this 18th day of May, 1998. 
DURHAM, EVANS, JONES & PINEGAR, P.C. 
R. Stephen Marshall 
Steve K. Gordon 
Attorneys for Defendants Gene V. Crawford 
and Sherry T. Crawford 
1On March 12,1998, the Court executed an Order extending the date by which the Crawfords must file their 
Notice of Appeal until May 30, 1998, or 10 days from the date of the Order, which ever occurs later. 
g:skg\cra\yford\pleadings\notice of appeal Page -2-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 18th day of May, 1998,1 caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL to be mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Donald L.Dalton, Esq. 
Bradley R. Cahoon, Esq. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL 
& MCCARTHY 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
Post Office Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Randy B. Hart, Esq. 
Assistant Murray City Attorney 
5025 South State Street 
Post Office Box 57520 
Murray Utah, 84157 
Martin S. Tanner (4419) 
HOWE & TANNER 
340 Broadway Centre 
111 East Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-5250 
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UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AMENDMENT XIV, SECTION 1 
CITIZENSHIP - DUE PROCESS OF LAW - EQUAL PROTECTION 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and the State wherein they reside. No State shall 
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; not deny to any person with its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
TabL 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH, ARTICLE I, § 7 - DUE PROCESS OF LAW 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law. 
TabM 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, RULE 56 - SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
(a) For Claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 
days from the commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary 
judgment by the adverse party, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary 
judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof. 
(b) For Defending Party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move with or 
without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part 
thereof. 
(c) Motion and Proceedings Thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall 
be filed and served in accordance with CJA 4-501. The judgment sought shall be rendered 
if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with 
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, 
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is 
a genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case Not Fully Adjudicated on Motion. If on motion under this rule judgment is 
not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court 
at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and by 
interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without 
substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. 
It shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial 
controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other relief is not in 
controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are just. Upon the trial 
of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be 
conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of Affidavits; Further Testimony; Defense Required. Supporting and 
opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would 
be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify 
to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred 
to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit 
affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or 
further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided 
in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his 
pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth 
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, 
summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
(f) When Affidavits Are Unavailable, Should it appear from the affidavits of a party 
opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to 
justify his opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a 
continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be 
had or may make such other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits Made in Bad Faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of the court at 
any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are presented in bad faith 
or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order the party employing them 
to pay to the other party the amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the 
affidavits caused him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party 
or attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
TabN 
UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, RULE 4-501 - MOTIONS 
Intent: 
To establish a uniform procedure for filing motions, supporting memoranda and 
documents with the court. 
To establish a uniform procedure for requesting and scheduling hearings on 
dispositive motions. 
To establish a procedure for expedited dispositions. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to motion practice in all district courts except proceedings before 
the court commissioners and small claims cases. This rule does not apply to petitions for 
habeas corpus or other forms of extraordinary relief. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Filing and Service of Motions and Memoranda, 
(a) Motion and Supporting Memoranda. All motions, except uncontested or ex-parte 
matters, shall be accompanied by a memorandum of points and authorities, appropriate 
affidavits, and copies of or citations by page number to relevant portions of depositions, 
exhibits or other documents relied upon in support of the motion. Memoranda supporting 
or opposing a motion shall not exceed ten pages in length exclusive of the "statement of 
material facts" as provided in paragraph (2), except as waived by order of the court on 
ex-parte application. If an ex-parte application is made to file an over-length memorandum, 
the application shall state the length of the principal memorandum, and if the memorandum 
is in excess often pages, the application shall include a summary of the memorandum, not 
to exceed five pages. 
(b) Memorandum in Opposition to Motion. The responding party shall file and serve 
upon all parties within ten days after service of a motion, a memorandum in opposition to the 
motion, and all supporting documentation. If the responding party fails to file a 
memorandum in opposition to the motion within ten days after service of the motion, the 
moving party may notify the clerk to submit the matter to the court for decision as provided 
in paragraph (l)(d) of this rule. 
(c) Reply Memorandum. The moving party may serve and file a reply memorandum 
within five days after service of the responding party's memorandum. 
(d) Notice to Submit for Decision. Upon the expiration of the five-day period to file 
a reply memorandum, either party may notify the Clerk to submit the matter to the court for 
decision. The notification shall be in the form of a separate written pleading and captioned 
"Notice to Submit for Decision." The notification shall contain a certificate of mailing to all 
parties. If neither party files a notice, the motion will not be submitted for decision. 
(2) Motions for Summary Judgment. 
(a) Memorandum in Support of a Motion. The points and authorities in support of 
a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a section that contains a concise statement 
of material facts as to which movant contends no genuine issue exists. The facts shall be 
stated in separate numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to those portions of the 
record upon which the movant relies. 
(b) Memorandum in Opposition to a Motion. The points and authorities in opposition 
to a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a section that contains a concise 
statement of material facts as to which the party contends a genuine issue exists. Each 
disputed fact shall be stated in separate numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to 
those portions of the record upon which the opposing party relies, and, if applicable, shall 
state the numbered sentence or sentences of the movant's facts that are disputed. All material 
facts set forth in the movant's statement and properly supported by an accurate reference to 
the record shall be deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless specifically 
controverted by the opposing party's statement. 
(3) Hearings. 
(a) A decision on a motion shall be rendered without a hearing unless ordered by the 
Court, or requested by the parties as provided in paragraphs (3)(b) or (4) below. 
(b) In cases where the granting of a motion would dispose of the action or any issues 
in the action on the merits with prejudice, either party at the time of filing the principal 
memorandum in support of or in opposition to a motion may file a written request for a 
hearing. 
(c) Such request shall be granted unless the court finds that (a) the motion or 
opposition to the motion is frivolous or (b) that the dispositive issue or set of issues 
governing the granting or denial of the motion has been authoritatively decided. 
(d) When a request for hearing is denied, the court shall notify the requesting party. 
When a request for hearing is granted, the court shall set the matter for hearing or notify the 
requesting party that the matter shall be heard and the requesting party shall schedule the 
matter for hearing and notify all parties of the date and time. 
(e) In those cases where a hearing is granted, a courtesy copy of the motion, 
memorandum of points and authorities and all documents supporting or opposing the motion 
shall be delivered to the judge hearing the matter at least two working days before the date 
set for hearing. Copies shall be clearly marked as courtesy copies and indicate the date and 
time of the hearing. Courtesy copies shall not be filed with the clerk of the court. 
(f) If no written request for a hearing is made at the time the parties file their principal 
memoranda, a hearing on the motion shall be deemed waived. 
(g) All dispositive motions shall be heard at least thirty (30) days before the scheduled 
trial date. No dispositive motions shall be heard after that date without leave of the Court. 
(4) Expedited Dispositions. Upon motion and notice and for good cause shown, the 
court may grant a request for an expedited disposition in any case where time is of the 
essence and compliance with the provisions of this rule would be impracticable or where the 
motion does not raise significant legal issues and could be resolved summarily. 
(5) Telephone Conference. The court on its own motion or at a party's request may 
direct arguments of any motion by telephone conference without court appearance. A 
verbatim record shall be made of all telephone arguments and the rulings thereon if requested 
by counsel. 
TabO 
MURRAY CITY ZONING ORDINANCES, SECTION 17.68.160.C 
17.68.160 Off-premise signs. 
Except where otherwise prohibited by this chapter, off-premise signs may be erected 
and maintained in commercial and manufacturing zones subject to the following conditions: 
* * * * 
C. Separation. A minimum of 500 feet radial spacing from any other off-
premise advertising sign. 
